Introduction: A Historic Reform Stalls at the Finish Line
Pakistan has entered a decisive moment in its civil–military governance with the creation of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) — a powerful new post meant to reshape the country’s higher defence command structure. Designed to replace the long-standing office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), the CDF role was heralded as a cornerstone of institutional reform under the 27th Constitutional Amendment.
Yet, despite the amendment’s passage and the formal abolition of the CJCSC post, the government failed to issue a notification appointing Pakistan’s first CDF as the Nov 29 deadline quietly passed. The delay has sparked legal debate, political speculation, and unease within security circles, raising questions not just about procedure — but about power, precedent, and long-term command authority within Pakistan’s armed forces.
At the center of this unfolding situation is Field Marshal General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), who is expected to assume the newly created dual role of COAS and CDF.
So why did the expected notification not arrive? Was there a legal vacuum? Or is the delay a sign of deeper disagreements within the state’s power structure?
The Birth of the Chief of Defence Forces Post
The Chief of Defence Forces position was created under the 27th Constitutional Amendment, which fundamentally altered Pakistan’s defence leadership arrangement.
What Changed?
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The CJCSC office was abolished effective Nov 27
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A new unified defence command model was introduced
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The Army Chief would concurrently serve as Chief of Defence Forces
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The CDF would serve a five-year term
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The role aims to integrate strategic planning, joint operations, and inter-services coordination
This was presented as a move toward streamlined decision-making and stronger central command, particularly in an era of evolving regional security challenges.
Why November 29 Became a Critical Date
November 29 gained significance because it marked the end of the original three-year tenure of General Asim Munir as Army Chief, based on the law under which he was appointed in November 2022.
The Legal Debate
Some legal experts initially argued that:
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Without a fresh notification, the COAS’s term could legally be viewed as expired
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The absence of a CDF appointment complicated matters further due to the abolition of the CJCSC
However, this view is not universally accepted.
Army Act Amendment: Why Some Say There Was No Legal Deadline
In 2024, parliament amended the Pakistan Army Act, extending the tenure of service chiefs from three to five years.
Crucially, the amendment included a powerful “deeming clause”, stating that the change:
“Shall always be deemed to have been part of the Pakistan Army Act.”
What This Means
According to many constitutional lawyers:
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The law retroactively validates the extended tenure
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No fresh notification was required to extend the COAS term
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November 29 did not constitute a legal cut-off date for General Munir’s service as Army Chief
This interpretation significantly reduces the likelihood of any legal vacuum regarding the COAS position.
Why the CDF Still Requires a Fresh Notification
While the COAS tenure extension may be legally protected, there is near-universal agreement among security and constitutional officials on one key point:
The Chief of Defence Forces appointment requires a formal, public notification.
Why Is This Different?
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The CDF is a new constitutional post, not a continuation of an existing one
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Its powers, jurisdiction, and reporting lines differ from previous roles
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Appointment must occur under the authority of the 27th Amendment
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The role formally replaces the CJCSC
This means that until notified:
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The CDF post remains unoccupied in law
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The restructured defence framework remains incomplete
Why Has the Notification Been Delayed?
Security and government insiders point to unresolved internal debates at the highest levels.
1. When Does the Five-Year Clock Begin?
One of the most sensitive questions reportedly under discussion is:
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Should General Munir’s five-year term be counted from November 2022 (his original appointment)?
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Or from November 2025, when the new legislation took effect?
This decision carries enormous implications:
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It determines the length of civilian oversight under the current leadership
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It affects future succession planning within the armed forces
No consensus on this issue would naturally delay a formal notification.
2. Command Authority Over the Air Force and Navy
Another major unresolved issue concerns operational control.
Key Question
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Will the CDF exercise direct operational authority over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN)?
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Or will those services retain a higher degree of autonomous command?
This issue strikes at the heart of inter-services balance and institutional autonomy — an area historically treated with extreme caution in Pakistan’s civil-military architecture.
Contrast With Quiet Extensions Elsewhere
The delay stands in stark contrast to earlier decisions:
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Air Chief Marshal Zaheer-ud-din Babar
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ISI Director General Lt Gen Asim Malik
Both received extensions without public notification, reflecting a quieter, more administrative approach.
However, insiders stress that:
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The CDF post cannot be handled quietly
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A public notification is constitutionally and politically unavoidable
Embarrassment and Institutional Costs
The absence of a timely notification has reportedly caused embarrassment within senior military leadership, particularly because:
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The transition was meant to be seamless
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Military planners had already aligned future command structures with the CDF framework
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The CJCSC office has ceased to exist without a full replacement in effect
This administrative gap risks undermining confidence in the reform process itself.
The National Strategic Command: Another Key Appointment on Hold
One major casualty of the delay is the appointment of the Commander of the National Strategic Command (NSC) — a newly created four-star post.
Why It Matters
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The NSC commander will assume responsibility for nuclear command and control
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This role was previously held by the CJCSC
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Officials believe the appointment cannot proceed until the CDF notification is issued
This means Pakistan’s strategic command structure is in a transitional limbo.
Legal Gaps in the National Command Authority Act
Another unresolved dimension is the National Command Authority (NCA) Act, which still reflects the old CJCSC-based framework.
Pending Amendments Will Address
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Removal of CJCSC references
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Integration of the CDF and NSC commander
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Clarification of service chiefs’ roles within the NCA
A Particularly Sensitive Issue
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Will the PAF and PN chiefs retain representation in the NCA?
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Or will their strategic roles be fully absorbed under the unified NSC command?
These decisions carry long-term implications for Pakistan’s nuclear governance model.
Conclusion: Reform Without Resolution
The failure to notify Pakistan’s first Chief of Defence Forces on time is not merely a clerical oversight. It reflects unresolved strategic, legal, and institutional questions at the apex of state power.
While the COAS tenure issue appears legally settled, the CDF appointment remains unfinished business, delaying:
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Full operationalization of the 27th Amendment
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Appointment of key strategic commanders
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Legal clarity in nuclear command arrangements
Until the notification is issued, Pakistan’s ambitious defence reform remains halfway implemented — a powerful structure waiting for its keystone.